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Summary
Geometry, etymologically the “science of measuring the Earth”, is a mathematical formaliza-
tion of space. Just as formal concepts of number may be rooted in an evolutionary ancient sys-
tem for perceiving numerical quantity, the fathers of geometry may have been inspired by their 
perception of space. Is the spatial content of formal Euclidean geometry universally present 
in the way humans perceive space, or is Euclidean geometry a mental construction, specific to 
those who have received appropriate instruction? The spatial content of the formal theories of 
geometry may depart from spatial perception for two reasons: first, because in geometry, only 
some of the features of spatial figures are theoretically relevant; and second, because some geo-
metric concepts go beyond any possible perceptual experience. Focusing in turn on these two 
aspects of geometry, we will present several lines of research on US adults and children from the 
age of three years, and participants from an Amazonian culture, the Mundurucu. Almost all the 
aspects of geometry tested proved to be shared between these two cultures. Nevertheless, some 
aspects involve a process of mental construction where explicit instruction seem to play a role in 
the US, but that can still take place in the absence of instruction in geometry.
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The axioms of geometry introduced by Euclid circa 300 B.C. [1] define concepts with spa-
tial content, such that any theorem or demonstration of Euclidean geometry can be realized 
in the construction of a figure. Just as intuitions about numerosity may have inspired the 
early mathematicians to develop mathematical theories of number and arithmetic, Euclid 
may have appealed to universal intuitions of space when constructing his theory of geom-
etry. In the current chapter, we investigate this proposition by assessing how much of the 
spatial content of Euclidean geometry is present in our spontaneous intuitions about space.
There are two major aspects of the spatial content of Euclidean geometry that may depart 
from our perception of space. First, in geometry, only some of the features of spatial fig-
ures are theoretically relevant. For example, Euclid introduces axioms pertaining to angles, 
where he points to the right angle as a special figure; but he does not introduce definitions 
related to orientation, such as a definition of horizontal or vertical lines. In this sense, geo-
metric representations may be more specific than spatial representations: to qualify as “geo-
metric”, spatial representations must instantiate invariance by the properties that are not 
theoretically relevant to formal geometry. Second, some of the concepts of geometry tran-
scend spatial perception by their very definition. Hence, Euclid’s axioms introduce ideal 
concepts whose extension in space is either infinitely small or large, extending beyond the 
limits of our perception. For example, for Euclid a line is an object so infinitely thin that it 
has no width, while at the same time its extension in the length direction may be infinite.
In the following, we will focus in turn on those two aspects of geometry and raise the 
questions of their universality and development. A first possibility would be that all humans 
have access to the spatial content of Euclidean geometry, either because we all come to learn 
A large part of the research effort in 
geometry has focused on navigation tasks, 
following the classic behavioral and neuro-
physiological research of Tolman [33] and 
O’Keefe and Nadel [34], respectively, and 
invigorated by Cheng’s seminal discovery 
that animals use the geometry of their sur-
roundings to establish their orientation [35]. 
The system encoding space for reorientation 
is truly geometric in the sense that it encodes 
information about the shape of the environ-
ment, and ignores featural information such 
as colors, or landmark objects [36] (but see 
[37] for a different view). However, the sys-
tem of geometry-informed navigation fails 
to reach abstraction in two points. First, it 
fails to encode some geometric information, 
namely angle [31,38,39]. Second, it also fails 
to recognize geometry in 2D displays, a 
main domain of Euclidean geometry [31,40]. 
Nevertheless, sensitivity to 2D shapes is 
present even in infants [41], which leads us 
to postulate the existence of a second cogni-
tive system of geometric content, dedicated 
to small, manipulable objects and 2D displays 
[31]. As reviewed in the present chapter, this 
system is sensitive to angle and length, while 
it ignores distinctions of sense: it is thus com-
plementary to the geometry-informed navi-
gation system, which encodes length and 
sense, but not angle. Children may need to 
learn to combine the information given 
by these two systems to create an integrated 
representation of Euclidean geometry.
BOX 19.1
T W O  D I S S O C I AT E D  S Y S T E M S  O F  C O R E 
K N O W L E D G E  F O R  G E O M E T RY
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it on the basis of an experience of space that is general enough to be universal, or because 
Euclidean geometry expresses core aspects of our perception of space (Box 19.1). On the con-
trary, geometric concepts may only be available to those who have received relevant instruc-
tion, or invested considerable energy in their mental construction. To address these issues, 
the present chapter will present several lines of evidence involving children of different 
ages, and people from an Amazonian culture, the Mundurucu.
UNIVERSAL GEOMETRIC INTUITIONS
In a first study, we probed a variety of geometric intuitions in a people from the Amazon, 
the Mundurucu [2]. The participants had no instruction in geometry, and their language 
does not have terms for basic Euclidean concepts such as parallelism or right angle. In one 
test, participants had to detect an image that was “different” or “weird” in slides of six 
images. Five of these images illustrated a geometric property (e.g., parallelism), while the 
remaining one lacked this property (non-parallel lines) (Fig. 19.1A). Care was taken to intro-
duce maximal variation on irrelevant aspects of the images. For instance, in the previous 
example, the distractor pair of lines varied in terms of the distance between the two lines, 
the length of each line, and their orientation. This variation created several options for the 
participants, who may have relied either on geometry or on other aspects of the shapes to 
elect their answer. Nevertheless, across a variety of trials targeting different geometric prop-
erties, adult and children Mundurucu used principally the abstract geometric properties of 
the figures and performed well above chance. Furthermore, their performance across tri-
als correlated tightly with the performance of adult and children control participants from 
the US (Fig. 19.1B). Despite dramatic differences in geometric education between these two 
groups, the trials that were harder for the Munducuru were also harder for the US partici-
pants. This test therefore reveals a signature of geometric intuitions, by establishing a hier-
archy of saliency between the different geometric and non-geometric properties of images. 
This signature is impervious to instruction in geometry, and potentially universal across cul-
tures. More recently, we also found evidence for continuity through development in a study 
including 448 participants from the US, ranging in age from three to 51 years: the same cor-
relations were observed across all age groups [3] (Fig. 19.1C).
However, because the test spans a large range of geometric properties, and each trial is 
unique, it cannot suffice to infer the content of our geometric intuitions. In particular, the 
correlational findings suggest that participants relied mostly on geometry in processing 
shapes, but also used non-geometric cues when choosing an outlying figure. In an attempt 
to better characterize the geometric content of our spatial intuitions, the following sections 
will present new experimental tests controlling more closely the type of spatial variations 
introduced in the images (geometric and non-geometric). These tests will focus on features 
that are particularly diagnostic of the concepts of Euclidean geometry: global size, length 
proportions, angle, sense, and orientation.
PERCEPTION OF ABSTRACT GEOMETRIC FEATURES
Under the framework of transformational geometry (Box 19.2), Euclidean geometry can 
be conceived as a list of embedded theories, which differ by the type of features they make 
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explicit. Briefly, in all versions of Euclidean theory, angle and length proportions are defin-
ing features of figures, while position or orientation are not; the status of sense and global 
size is variable. From a psychologist’s point of view, the framework of transformational 
geometry defines a research program: to look at the perception of some abstract geometric 
feature despite variations of other aspects of the displays, such as orientation, position, or 
global size [4]. If people are sensitive to geometry in the sense of one of the Euclidean theo-
ries, the defining features of this geometry should be easy to perceive, even with concomi-
tant variations of non-defining features, and hard to ignore when their variation is made 
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FIGURE 19.1 Generic test of geometric intuitions. Participants were presented with a series of 45 slides such 
as those in (A), each illustrating a distinct geometric property. In each slide, five of the images share a geometric 
property which the last image lacks. The participants were asked to pick the image that was “different”, or “weird 
and ugly”. The test was first administered to 14 children and 30 adults from the Mundurucu population, as well as 
control groups of 26 children and 28 adults in the US. The responses across trials were highly correlated between 
these two populations, in each age group (B). Later, the test was also administered to 448 participants from the 
US aged three to 51 years, and revealed the same correlation across age groups (C). A and B adapted from [2]; C 
adapted from [3].
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In Klein’s transformational geometry 
framework, any geometric theory (such as 
Euclidean geometry) can entirely be defined 
by the set of its invariant transformations, 
i.e. transformations that do not affect the 
theorems of that theory [42]. For example, 
if a geometry theory is invariant by transla-
tion, then for that geometry two figures that 
are identical, except that they are placed in 
different positions in space, are considered 
equivalent: exactly the same list of theorems 
can be proven of either of these two figures. 
(Of course, the relationships between these 
two figures could be the object of other theo-
rems, such as theorems describing how the 
sides of these two figures are parallel to each 
other: such theorems are concerned with the 
global figure formed of the two translated 
versions, and therefore do not consider the 
two subfigures equivalent. In other words, 
invariant transformations must be thought 
as irrelevant when applied to the whole 
figure, not only a subpart.)
The transformational framework allows 
us to think of geometric theories as embed-
ded within each other, with increasing lev-
els of invariance: as long as a subset of the 
parent geometry’s invariant transformations 
set verifies certain combination properties, 
this subset defines a valid theory of geom-
etry. For example, in 2D geometry, Euclid’s 
axioms create a high level of invariance, 
with four types of invariant transformations: 
translation (position in space), rotation (ori-
entation), symmetry (sense), and homothecy 
(global size) (see Box 19.2 Fig. 1). This list of 
invariant transformations leaves angle and 
length proportions as essential properties of 
a figure. By comparison, in the geometry cre-
ated by solid movement of objects, which is 
embedded within Euclid’s full theory, only 
translations and rotations are included in 
the set of invariant transformations: besides 
angle and length proportions, sense and 
global size are also defining features of fig-
ures in this geometry. Embedded between 
these two geometries, one can also define 
a Euclidean geometry that is sensitive to 
angle, length proportions, and global size 
while being agnostic to sense: we will refer 
to this system of geometry as “the geometry 
of non-oriented solid movements”.
BOX 19.2
T R A N S F O R M AT I O N A L  G E O M E T RY
Translation
position invariance
Rotation
orientation invariance
Symmetry
sense invariance
Homothety
size invariance
BOX 19.2 FIG. 1 Illustration of the four 
types of invariant transformations for 
Euclidean geometry.
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irrelevant to a task. On the contrary, the properties that are irrelevant to Euclidean geometry, 
such as orientation and position, should be easy to ignore.1
To our knowledge, the question has rarely been addressed in this form in the literature 
(see [8–11] for a few exceptions). However, evidence from infants [12–14], young children 
[15,16], adults [7–11,17,18], and single-unit recordings [19] (see a review of mirror image 
confusions in [20]) seem to indicate that length (both relative and absolute) and angle have 
a privileged status in form perception. In contrast, the perception of sense requires an addi-
tional step of mentally aligning the objects, as in the classical experiments of mental rota-
tion [7]. This would argue that the intuitive basis for geometry is a non-oriented Euclidean 
geometry. However, all the evidence summarized above comes from a variety of tasks, dis-
plays, measures, and population, thus making direct comparisons difficult.
We designed a new test focusing specifically and systematically on the defining features 
of some or all of the Euclidean geometries: angle, size, and sense [3]. As in the original 
intruder test [2], participants were presented with six figures for each trial, and instructed 
to find the figure that was “very different”. Each figure was shaped like an L, except that 
the orientation of the figure, its size, its sense (akin to an L or the mirror image of an L), and 
the angle between the two branches could vary. On “pure trials”, one of the figures differed 
from the others in terms of size, angle, or sense, while all other parameters were kept con-
stant, except for the global orientation and position of the figure (Fig. 19.2A). On “interfer-
ence trials”, a second dimension was allowed to vary progressively across figures, but not 
in a way that defined a unique deviant: for example, when size was the interfering dimen-
sion, each of the six figures was presented in a different size. The test was administered to 
104 participants from three to 34 years of age. In all the groups tested, angle and size devi-
ants were detected better than the sense deviants (Fig. 19.2B). Even the youngest children 
(mean age 3.91 years) were able to use angle and size, but only adults relied on sense in 
their search for the deviant figure. Furthermore, in “interference” trials, introducing irrel-
evant variations of size or angle impaired the detection of the deviant, while participants 
were not disturbed by irrelevant variations of sense (Fig. 19.2C). In fact, when an irrelevant 
variation of size or angle was present, participants sometimes used this dimension to make 
their choice, electing for example the largest or the smallest shape.
More recently, we observed the same pattern of performance in a group of 25 Mundurucu 
participants: on the “pure” trials, adults and children detected the size and angle devi-
ants successfully while failing to detect the sense deviants. Similarly, “interference trials” 
revealed that they were sensitive to irrelevant variations of size and angle, but not sense.
Our results on sense may seem surprising, given that even preschoolers can succeed at 
mental rotation tasks, when they are given explicit instruction or when the stimuli are embed-
ded in an ecological Tetris game task [21,22]. In adults, the detection of sense variations is spe-
cific in that it requires the use of mental rotation, whereas metric differences can be perceived 
1 In terms of mechanisms, for any of the relevant features, organisms could opt for either of two computational 
solutions: the first solution would be to extract that feature directly, abstracting away non-relevant aspects in 
the figure. It has been proposed that this kind of solution is used for encoding numerosity [5], and reflects the 
organization of the visual system at large [6]. Another solution would be to impose a mental transformation 
and realign the displays, to then apply direct pattern matching between the realigned displays. This solution is 
used, for example, to detect sense deviations in classic mental rotation tasks [7].
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Pure trials
Size SenseAngle
(A) Examples of trials
Interference trials
angle, size interference size, angle interference sense, angle interference
angle, sense interference size, sense interference sense, size interference
(B) Pure trials accuracy (C) Interference effect
15%
10
Angle
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Sense
3–4 yo 7–8 yo 9–11 yo Adults Angle Size Sense
5
0
US participants Interference
FIGURE 19.2 Test on the perception of angle, size and sense. Participants (US children and adults: n  104; 
Mundurucu children and adults: n  25) were presented with 27 to 162 slides of six images and asked to pick the 
image that seemed “different” or “weird and ugly”. Trials were of two types. In the “pure” trials (A), the deviant 
was defined by a single difference in either angle, size, or sense, while the non-deviant figures differed only in ori-
entation. In the “interference” trials, variations were introduced in a second dimension, but not in a way to define 
a clear deviant. (B) Responses were more accurate to the angle and size pure trials than to the sense pure trials. (C) 
Also, an interference of angle or size reduced the level of accuracy in the responses, compared to corresponding 
pure trials without this inference. On the contrary, trials on angle and size were not affected by an irrelevant varia-
tion of sense. Adapted from [3].
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directly, without a need to mentally realign shapes [23]. The context of a Tetris game can facili-
tate the recruitment of motor resources for children: they can manipulate the shapes with a 
joystick to fit them in a hole pictured at the bottom of the screen. Our task made it less natu-
ral for participants to engage motor resources, because the shapes did not present any motor 
affordance, and also because the sense trials were interleaved with other trials where mental 
rotation was not needed. Together, these task features could explain the failure of the youngest 
participants. More crucially, the judgment we asked from our participants differed from the 
same/different judgments involved in mental rotation tasks: our instructions (to find a “very 
different” shape amongst shapes that were “all a little bit different”) boiled down to asking 
participants what type of differences they found relevant to shape classification. The refusal 
of the children to use mental rotation reveals that sense differences do not appear an impor-
tant factor of shape classification to their eyes: children did try hard to solve the sense trials, 
but instead of using mental rotation and checking for sense deviants, they looked at subtle 
differences in the pixelization, or sometimes chose randomly with evident frustration. These 
results suggest that adults entertain a more integrated concept of shape, rooted in a variety of 
cognitive mechanisms, whereas the concept of the children is only linked to shape perception 
systems. Before the integration of motor resources into the concept of shape, sense does not 
appear to be an important, defining aspect of shapes, at least in a context where shapes are 
allowed to vary in orientation.
Together, these results indicate that when classifying shapes, sensitivity to angle and size 
is universal, while sensitivity to sense is not. When comparing to Euclidean geometry sys-
tems, the intuitive geometry implied by the participants’ classification of shapes picks the 
invariants of the non-oriented geometry of solid objects, maybe because these invariants are 
the most useful in object identification and classification.2
NORMATIVE GEOMETRIC CONCEPTS
We now turn to a second aspect of geometric knowledge, namely the ability to grasp con-
cepts that go beyond any perceptual experience. As a first window into these concepts, we 
consider first the angle categories. Much as discrete integers are crystallized from a continuous 
representation of numerosity [24], educated adults crystallize angles into sharp categories of 
acute, right, and obtuse angles; parallel lines may be viewed as a kind of remarkable angle too. 
Although it is not necessary to possess a rich conceptual structure to be able to form catego-
ries, such absolute, sharp angle categorization is a prerequisite to reasoning about non-perceiv-
able, normative properties, such as the fact that in some special cases, lines may never cross.
We studied children’s judgment of categorizations by presenting 141 participants from 
the US (aged three to 34 years) with displays such as those of Fig. 19.3 [25]. In none of the 
trials did angle define a clear deviant, unless participants elected to use the angle catego-
ries of Euclidean geometry. Indeed, all adults picked the right angles, the parallel lines or 
the perpendicular lines as deviant in those displays. However, in children, parallelism and 
right angles were dissociated: all the groups chose the parallel lines as being special, while 
2 Nevertheless, the role of metric properties in object identification has been debated: perhaps, the 
identification of shapes is computed only on the basis of structural or “non-accidental” properties [27,28].
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only children aged seven years and over picked the right angle and perpendicular lines. 
Furthermore, in a short post-test we asked the children to draw a right angle, parallel lines 
and perpendicular lines in order to assess their knowledge of the relevant lexical terms: in 
accord with the general performance at the categorization task, the knowledge of the lexical 
terms “right angle” or “perpendicular lines” facilitated the detection of these figures in chil-
dren, while the knowledge of the term for “parallel lines” had no effect on the detection of 
parallels. These results indicate that different normative categories develop along different 
trajectories, with a category for parallelism possibly present from start, while the category of 
right angle gets constructed once the child has acquired the relevant lexicon.
Because some Mundurucu do not receive any instruction in geometry, testing them helps 
to probe the universality of the right angle category. If specific instruction or an appropri-
ate lexicon is necessary, Mundurucu should not pick a right angle as being special amongst 
a range of angles; however, if the lexicon just acts as a mere catalyst in the US children, the 
Mundurucu may direct their choices towards the right angles. Although the previous test 
has not yet been administered to Mundurucu participants, an examination of a subtest of 
the trials in the previous experiment (trials on sense with angle interference) could address 
this question (Fig. 19.2A): indeed, since Mundurucu were not sensitive to sense, these tri-
als must have appeared as a test of angle categories to the participants. Examination of the 
responses in those particular trials revealed that the Mundurucu did choose the right angles 
more often than chance. This result raises the possibility that right angle may be a universal 
category of angle, even though instruction on the relevant lexicon appears to play a role in 
the acquisition of this category in young US children.
In further research, it would be interesting to evaluate the role of experience in the cat-
egorization of right angles by separating different subgroups of Mundurucu participants, 
Non-connected linesConnected lines
Parallel lines
Perpendicular lines
Right angle
FIGURE 19.3 Test on angle categories. In this new version of the intruder task, variations in angle do not 
define a clear deviant unless the participants are sensitive to exact angle categories. Stimuli with connected lines 
probed the sensitivity to right angle, while stimuli with non-connected lines tested parallel and perpendicular lines.
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living either in carpentered villages (where right angles are prominent) or in very rural 
areas. On the other hand, the performance of the Mundurucu suggests that the role played 
by instruction in US children may be limited in scope. It is possible that the acquisition of 
geometric vocabulary helps children forming a category of right angle, without implying 
any sensitivity to the geometric properties of this figure: perhaps children considered right 
angles to be special only because they have a name. In this case, the effect of elementary 
instruction would be initially superficial but may still have enduring effects on the devel-
opment of geometry, by directing the attention of the child towards categories relevant to 
Euclidean geometry and therefore facilitating later conceptual learning.
In general, although sharp categories can provide a window onto normative concepts, 
being able to categorize parallel lines or right angles does not require an elaborate concep-
tual apparatus and could even be derived from experience. Thus, we attempted to design 
one last test probing the most abstract geometric concepts directly [26]. Participants were 
introduced to an ideal shape, either an infinite plane or a sphere. The experimenter nar-
rated the properties of the shape (“it is very, very flat and goes on forever and ever” or “it 
is very round, like a ball”), straight, infinite lines, as well as dots (Fig. 19.4A). Following this 
introduction phase, participants were given a list of questions pertaining to the properties 
of straight lines. Impressively, Mundurucu adults and children performed extremely accu-
rately at the test, especially on the plane. Most of them agreed that a new straight line may 
always be placed in such way that “it would never cross” a first straight line. They also cor-
rectly modulated their responses to adapt them to the planar and spherical environments 
tested. Beyond categorization, this last test argues for elaborate, non-perceivable concepts 
being universal.
These concepts may either be part of an innate “core knowledge”, or may have been 
acquired by interactions with the environment. In order to separate these hypotheses, we 
tested five- and six-year-old US children on the same questionnaire task. Although the 
young children performed above chance in the plane test, they were much less accurate 
compared to the other groups; in particular, they responded at chance when asked about 
parallelism. Moreover, they failed to adapt their responses to the spherical context. These 
results indicate that the concepts of Euclidean geometry are only partially in place at the 
age of five or six years; while being universal, Euclidean geometry nevertheless appears to 
result from a mental construction.
The finding on parallelism has important implications for our interpretation of the results 
of the previous task. Contrary to adults, the categorization of parallel lines by young chil-
dren does not rely on a rich conceptual theory of geometry, but probably on perceptual 
properties of parallel lines, such as the fact that the distance between them is constant, the 
fact that the two parallel segments look identical, or the fact that parallelism represents a 
singular point in angle values. Indeed, parallel lines may be regarded as a case where there 
is no angle to compute, therefore different from all other configurations; or the parallel lines 
may be perceived as related by an angle of 0°/180°, which is at the same time both a glo-
bal minimum and a global maximum for non-oriented angles. This singularity might be 
extracted on the basis of accumulated perceptual experience. Again, as in the case of the 
category of right angle, the perceptual categorization of parallel lines is compatible with the 
concepts of geometry. Even if it is not rooted in a rich conceptual understanding of geom-
etry, it could provide a stepping stone to conceptual development.
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CONCLUSION
Our research provides evidence that the basic principles of Euclidean geometry are 
reflected in intuitions of space that develop progressively throughout childhood, but still 
appear universal. From early childhood, the perception of shapes provides an intuitive 
ground corresponding to the geometry of non-oriented solid objects: preschoolers are sen-
sitive to angle and length, can abstract differences of orientation and position, but they 
also abstract away sense relations. These early intuitions are enriched over development in 
(A) Excerpts of the introductory description of the planar and spherical worlds
There are paths. Paths are all
straight. Paths go straight,
always in front of them.
There are villages. All
villages are very small.
Paths go right through
the center of the
villages.
This is a place where the land
is flat. It goes on forever.
This is a place where the land
is round, like a ball.
(B) Questionnaire
…
Example of question
Let us approach to see better… (Zoom)
Can you place a path
that does not cross any
of those paths?
…
FIGURE 19.4 Test of Euclidean reasoning. (A) Participants were first introduced to one of two ideal worlds, 
shaped either as a plane or a sphere. The experimenter narrated the properties of this world, and introduced the 
existence of very small villages (points), and paths that never turned or ended (straight lines). Following this 
introduction, participants were asked a series of 21 illustrated questions pertaining to the properties of points and 
lines in these worlds (B). Crucially, the sketches presented in the two subsets were identical: a zooming animation 
created the impression of coming so close to the sphere that it appeared flat.
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three ways. First, in their classification of shapes, adults recruit a special process to detect 
sense: mental rotation. Second, mental continua are progressively carved out into discrete 
categories that give prominence to particular figures. Third, children become able to reason 
about elaborate non-perceptible concepts. Although the acquisition of the relevant geomet-
ric lexicon seems to play a role in the formation of some discrete geometric categories for 
US children, this role may be reduced to that of a category-maker and catalyst. Indeed, in 
a population that did not receive any education or share any relevant lexicon in geometry, 
a brief description of ideal shapes sufficed to elicit elaborate thoughts about the fundamen-
tal ideal concepts of Euclidean geometry, such as infinite lines or parallelism.
How could geometry be universal, and at the same time develop progressively? A first 
possibility would be that geometric knowledge is derived from a type of spatial experi-
ence that is so general that every human would encounter it. For example, all humans may 
come to compute some geometric features of shapes such as angle, or length, because they 
are especially relevant to object identification and classification [15], or to action. This view 
raises the question of the development of ideal geometric concepts, which by definition can 
never be experienced directly, and would need to be derived from incomplete or approxi-
mate experience. For example, the Euclidean concept of a line with no width would need 
to be derived from experience with very thin lines; or the concept of parallelism for infi-
nite straight lines would need to be derived from experience with lines that do not cross 
locally—still a far cry from the property that parallel lines will never cross. Assuming this 
derivation to be impossible, Kant famously argued for knowledge of space (as well as 
geometry) being available a priori to experience [29,30].
Another possibility would be for geometry to be grounded on “core knowledge” [31], 
i.e. representations of abstract content that were selected by evolution, and provide useful 
guidelines to interpret the environment and learn. Representations of ideal straight lines or 
planes may be present in the architecture of the perceptual system to serve as anchors for 
perception, a strategy that has proven useful to reduce processing loads and increase relia-
bility in artificial vision [32]. Under this hypothesis, during childhood these implicit anchors 
would need to be progressively reformatted into explicit representations, to be able to enter 
thought processes and be manipulated directly—a process that may be time consuming, but 
potentially accessible to every human being.
In conclusion, we have provided evidence that geometric knowledge appears univer-
sal, based on two cultures that are maximally different in terms of education and lifestyle. 
Ultimately, however, claims of universality can never be verified directly, and would be better 
informed by looking at the factors that favor the acquisition of geometric knowledge. Geometric 
concepts may emerge spontaneously on the basis of a universal experience with space, or reflect 
intrinsic properties of the human mind. Precisely what type of experience is relevant, and what 
limits younger children in their conception of geometry awaits further research.
GLOSSARY
Universal
Present in all normally developing human beings, irrespective of their environment, level 
of education, etc. Some properties may even be universal beyond the human species, but in the 
present article we will only consider claims pertaining to humans.
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